CVE ID : CVE-2025-38348
Published : July 10, 2025, 9:15 a.m. | 4 hours, 51 minutes ago
Description : In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: p54: prevent buffer-overflow in p54_rx_eeprom_readback()
Robert Morris reported:
|If a malicious USB device pretends to be an Intersil p54 wifi
|interface and generates an eeprom_readback message with a large
|eeprom->v1.len, p54_rx_eeprom_readback() will copy data from the
|message beyond the end of priv->eeprom.
|
|static void p54_rx_eeprom_readback(struct p54_common *priv,
| struct sk_buff *skb)
|{
| struct p54_hdr *hdr = (struct p54_hdr *) skb->data;
| struct p54_eeprom_lm86 *eeprom = (struct p54_eeprom_lm86 *) hdr->data;
|
| if (priv->fw_var >= 0x509) {
| memcpy(priv->eeprom, eeprom->v2.data,
| le16_to_cpu(eeprom->v2.len));
| } else {
| memcpy(priv->eeprom, eeprom->v1.data,
| le16_to_cpu(eeprom->v1.len));
| }
| […]
The eeprom->v{1,2}.len is set by the driver in p54_download_eeprom().
The device is supposed to provide the same length back to the driver.
But yes, it’s possible (like shown in the report) to alter the value
to something that causes a crash/panic due to overrun.
This patch addresses the issue by adding the size to the common device
context, so p54_rx_eeprom_readback no longer relies on possibly tampered
values… That said, it also checks if the “firmware” altered the value
and no longer copies them.
The one, small saving grace is: Before the driver tries to read the eeprom,
it needs to upload >a
Severity: 0.0 | NA
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